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Abstract1 
In previous work we presented preliminary results 
obtained by reviewing the source code of Qlink.it 
web application. In this article, after summarizing 
previous findings, results of the source code review 
of Qlink.it Android application will be described. 
This analysis focused on the implementation of 
cryptographic functionalities. The aim of this 
publication is also to invite other researchers to 
analyze the application in order to determine if 
Qlink.it could be considered secure. 
Keywords: Information security, application 
security, source code review, cryptography, random 
number generation. 
Resumen 
En un trabajo previo presentamos los resultados 
preliminares obtenidos al revisar el código fuente de 
la aplicación web de Qlink.it. En este artículo, 
después de resumir los hallazgos anteriores, se 
describirán los resultados de la revisión del código 
fuente de la aplicación Android de Qlink.it. Este 
análisis se centró en la implementación de 
funcionalidades criptográficas. El objetivo de esta 
publicación es invitar a otros investigadores a 
analizar la aplicación para determinar si Qlink.it 
podría considerarse seguro. 
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1. Introduction
In previous work [1] we presented the preliminary 
results obtained by reviewing the source code of the 
Qlink.it web application. These results will be 
summarized below. In this article, the source code 
review findings of potential security problems in the 
Qlink.it Android application will be described. This 
source code is also published on the project 
repository on github.com [2], and the application can 
be installed on Android devices from Google Play 
[3]. 
This analysis also focused on the implementation 
of cryptographic functionalities. We’ll describe 
implemented mechanisms that discard key material 
significantly reducing the security against brute-
force attacks, code that reuses the same key and 
initialization vector applying AES 256 in CBC 
mode, and insecure ways of seeding secure random 
generators. At least one problem that could 
compromise the secrecy of the encrypted message 
will be described. This problem could be exploited if 
the qlink was generated in versions of the Android 
operating system prior to 4.2 and under certain very 
specific circumstances of message length and timing 
conditions. 
As mentioned in [1], given the news [4,5] about 
the availability of the Qlink.it source code [6], and 
considering, that among GICSI objectives, the group 
studies techniques and mechanisms for the revision 
of source code, focusing on aspects related to 
information security in general and to cryptography 
in particular [7,8]; and, that the DGT has the 
responsibility, among others, to periodically evaluate 
alternatives for the secure communication of the 
Institution's personnel; a first general review of the 
source code of the Qlink.it web application [9] was 
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carried out jointly. 
Our findings on the web application were 
published in our previous article. Here we describe 
the results obtained after the review of the source 
code of the Android application. By the time the first 
part of the analysis was completed (May 2017), the 
preliminary results of the review would indicate the 
existence of potential security problems, for which 
reason it was decided to consult Qlink.it developers 
sharing these results. 
Although it was a review that did not cover the 
entire system, and it was not finished, permission 
was requested to publish, in the form of an article, 
with the intention of inviting other reviewers to 
study the application, who could confirm or reject 
these potential risks, and determine if the system 
could be considered safe. 
A limited summary without all the details of the 
first results was also published on a website 
dedicated to information security, Segu-Info [10]. 
1.1. About Qlink.it 
As indicated in the project documentation [6,9], 
specifically in its FAQ section, “Qlink.it is a new, 
very simple and secure way to send confidential 
information through the internet”. 
In summary, according to the Qlink.it website, in 
its advanced FAQ [11], the operation of the system 
is described as follows: 
1. When you enter a message in qlink.it and
click the “qlink it!” button, your browser
runs a Javascript  program  which
encrypts  the  message  with  a  given
random  key,  say  for instance YYYYYY.
2. Afterwards, the encrypted message is sent
through secure https protocol to the Qlink.it
server.
3. At the server, the message (already
encrypted with key YYYYY) is encrypted
again to be stored, but now with another
random key, say for instance XXXXXX.
4. Then, the server returns to you a
preliminary qlink, in this case
https://qlink.it/XXXXXX.
5. At that moment, your browser adds at the
end of the preliminary qlink the key that
only your browser knows to form the full
qlink: https://qlink.it/XXXXXX#YYYYYY.
Notice that the Qlink.it server didn't have
access to the YYYYYY part of the qlink!
6. Then, you copy & paste the full qlink and
send it to the intended recipient, either by
email, chat, WhatsApp, or whatever.
7. When the recipient receives the full qlink
and clicks on it, the browser only requests
to the server the preliminary qlink,
https://qlink.it/XXXXXX, because the 
special character hash mark (#) indicates 
that what follows should not be sent 
through the internet! (You can check this 
feature by using for instance the inspect 
option in some browsers as could be 
Chrome.) Therefore, the Qlink.it server 
never has access to the full key to read the 
true content of the message! 
8. When the server receives the request with
the preliminary qlink, the qlink has in it the
key to look for the encrypted message and
partially decipher it. The server then sends
back through https secure protocol a
message which is still encrypted with the
unknown-to-the-server key YYYYYY. At that
moment the server makes a secure delete on
the encrypted message and is not available
any more at the server.
9. When the recipient's browser gets the
encrypted message, since it kept the last
part of the full qlink YYYYYY, it runs a Java
script to finally decipher the encrypted
message using this  last  part  of  the  full
qlink. Once  the  message  is  totally
deciphered,  the  browser displays it on the
recipient's screen.
2. Potential problems in the Qlink.it
web application
2.1. Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) vulnerability 
Although Javascript functions are used to filter input 
fields when generating a qlink, the one that contains 
the message does not seem to be verified or correctly 
filtered. 
The code below shows that simulating a browser 
requesting the web-service to generate a qlink, 
arbitrary Javascript code can be included. After a 
closing the textarea tag element that presents the 
decrypted message, a <script> element with an 
alert() invocation demonstrates the XSS 
vulnerability. 
Algorithm 1 Snippet of Python script written to 
demonstrate the XSS vulnerability. 
1: sess = requests.Session() 
2: r = sess.get(url + '/tokenizer', 
 headers=headers, data={}) 
3: x_token = r.json()['x_token'] 
4: message = "%%A%%</textarea><script> 
 alert(' Pru eba  XSS')</script>%%C%%" 
5: password = b'123456' 
6: salt = "ffffffffffffffff" # example 
7: iv = "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" # example 
8: key = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha1', password, 
binascii.unhexlify(salt), 100, dklen=32) 
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9: cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, 
 binascii.unhexlify(iv)) 
10: coded = base64.b64encode(cipher.encrypt 
(message .ljust(int(math.ceil(len(message) / 
 16.0) * 16), b'\0'))) 
11: data={'msg':'{"data":"'+coded+'","salt":"'+sa
lt+'","iv": 
"'+iv+',"iter":100,'x_token':x_token, ... } 
12: r = sess.post(url + '/inject', headers={ ... }, 
 data=data) 
13: print 'qlink: ' + r.json()['hash'] + '#' + 
password) 
Fig. 1  Screen capture accessing a qlink generated with 
the Algorithm 1 script Preparation of manuscript 
2.2. Cryptography implementation 
After the review of source code files 
public/js/application.js, app/src/Qlink/Models/Utils/ 
RandomHasher.php and /app/src/Qlink/Controllers/ 
LandingNewController.php, it was noticed that the 
first part of the qlink, that is, the first 10 characters, 
for example: http://qlink/two/XXXXXXXXXX... Are 
generated (not exclusively) based on a timestamp 
(with millisecond precision) -result of the Javascript 
function Date().getTime()- that the browser sends to 
the server, and therefore, that it could be 
manipulated. Although the server will register that 
value for use in the next qlink, using the previous 
value in the current request, previously registered in 
the same way, the value is then added to the server's 
timestamp, to the number of microseconds 
multiplied by 105, and used as a seed -by the 
mt_srand() function- to then obtain values from the 
mt_rand() function.  
These functions, based on the Mersenne Twister 
generator, are not suitable for generating random 
numbers for cryptographic operations, warning also 
explicitly noted in PHP official documentation [12]. 
For example, the following code snippet shows how 
the seed used to generate the first part of a qlink 
could be obtained: 
Algorithm 2 Python function source code that 
demonstrates how to obtain the seed used to 
generate the first part of a qlink. 
1: def obtener_semilla(parcial_qlink): 
2:     chars = '0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqr... 
3:     epoch = int(time.time()) 
4:     len_prueba = 60*60*24*1000*1 # 1 dia 
5:     ii = 99999 + 999 + epoch * 1001 
6:     max = 0 
7:     for i in xrange(len_prueba): 
8:        php_rand.mt_srand((0xFFFFF... & (ii-i))) 
9:         for j in range(len(parcial_qlink)): 
10:    g = php_rand.mt_rand(0, len(chars)-1) 
11:    if chars[g] != parcial_qlink[j]: 
12:        break 
13:    if (j + 1 > max): 
14:  max = j + 1 
15:  if max == 10: 
16:      return ii-i 
Regarding the code that will be executed in the 
browser through Javascript, although indirectly -
through the CryptoJS library and its function 
CryptoJS.lib.WordArray.random()-, random number 
generation ends up invoking the Javascript function 
Math.random(), which is implemented by most 
browsers based on variants of the Xorshift128 + 
generator, which is also not considered safe or 
recommended for the implementation of 
cryptography [13,14,15,16]. 
2.2.1. Estimating date and time of creation of a 
previous qlink 
It was shown that generating a new qlink and using 
its first ten characters to obtain the seed, it is 
possible to estimate of when the previous qlink was 
created. The script included in our previous work 
used the module or package pyphp_rand [17] as 
used in the example code of Algorithm 1. 
Suppose x as the Unix epoch timestamp from the 
moment the previous qlink was generated, in 
seconds; and xm to the parameter that was sent to the 
server at that moment, in milliseconds, so for the 
purposes of this approximate estimate, 1000x <xm 
<1000x + 999. Also assume t equal to the Unix 
epoch timestamp of the moment when we generate 
the new qlink, in seconds. Finally consider u as the 
amount in microseconds used in PHP, which would 
be generated such that 0 < u < 99999. 
Therefore, the seed for the qlink that we are 
generating, s, would correspond to xm + t + u. Then, 
s = xm + t + u , s = 1000x + y + t + z, with 0 < y < 
999 and 0 < z < 99999. Then, x = (s - y - t - z) / 
1000. This being an approximation, the term y / 
1000 could by eliminated, and z / 1000 is replaced 
by a delta d, with 0 < d < 99, then x = [(s - t) / 1000 
- 99, (s - t) / 1000]. So the approximation result 
corresponds to a range of 99 seconds. 
2.2.2. Obtaining the “DN number” from a qlink 
Also based on previous examples, it is possible to 
obtain the tracking code, or “DN number” from the 
Journal of Computer Science & Technology, Volume 18, Number 2, October 2018
-162-
first ten characters of the variable part of a qlink. 
The proof of concept script included in our previous 
article could be used against any qlink. 
The “DN number” is generated by a function 
very similar to the one used to generate the first ten 
characters code of a qlink, laying the difference in 
the set of possible characters for the mapping of 
random numbers. In this case, the result corresponds 
to ten digits. Also, the same timestamp is used for 
the generation of the first part of a qlink. The 
function is invoked after just over about 50 lines of 
code of the generation of the first part of the qlink. 
Therefore, another script of our previous article 
brute-force the time elapsed between the invocation 
of these two functions and then check the existence 
of the tracking code in a limited space, with the 
intention of reducing the amount of tests to be 
performed. 
2.2.3. Insecure random number generation using 
Javascript library CryptoJS 
Regarding issues related to the code executed in the 
browser, specifically in relation to the generation of 
random numbers, we have demonstrated potential 
problems with the use of a library based on the 
function that browsers provide, implementing the 
Xorshift128 + generator. 
In this case, our test script was an adaptation of 
another available in [18], which works directly with 
outputs of the Math.Random() function, using the Z3 
tool, “a high-performance theorem prover being 
developed at Microsoft Research” [19], for the 
symbolic resolution of the system of equations given 
the known partial information. The test example was 
adapted for resolution with values truncated by 
CryptoJS.lib.WordArray.random(). The way to 
generate the salt and the initialization vector in qlink 
was taken as an example to estimate or guess the 
following possible values of the generator. While the 
example does represent a risk, it should be 
considered that the same function is used to generate 
key material. 
3. Potential problems in the Qlink.it
Android application
3.1. Potentially insecure password 
generation 
From a SecureRandom instance seeded with 
timestamps and results of previous invocations, the 
source code snippet in Algorithm 3 shows the 
generation of the string that then would be encoded 
in base 64, truncated and used as input for 
generating the AES key, using SecretKeyFactory. 
getInstance("PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1"), requesting 
256 bits of key material, and specifying only 100 
iterations. 
Algorithm 3 Snippet of source code from the 
generateRandomString() method. 
1: SecureRandom r = new 
 SecureRandom(seeded.getBytes()); 
2: String characters ="0123456789abcdefghijkt... 
3: String randomString = ""; 
4: for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) { 
5:     int jind = r.nextInt(characters.length() - 1); 
6:     randomString = randomString +
characters.charAt(jind); 
Considering that truncation con leave only 16 
base 64 encoded characters,  the password consist of 
12 characters in the range [0-9a-zA-Y] (the Z is not 
included in the set because of an error in the 
nextInt() parameter). This leaves 61 possible 
characters, so if an attacker would try to brute-force 
this password, he will need to make, on average, 
6112/2 ≈ 270  tries. 
3.2. Key and IV reutilization with AES 256 
in CBC mode 
It is well known that for symmetric block ciphers 
operating in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, 
the key and the initialization vector should not be 
used more than once. 
The Qlink.it Android application allows to attach 
multiple files to a message, unlike the web 
application, here the same key and IV are used for 
the message and all the attached files. 
The following source code snippet in Algorithm 
4 shows that the contents of the fpassword variable, 
used also for encrypting the message, would be used 
for the attached file. This code, as the one from 
Algorithm 3, are taken from the src/com/qlink/ar/ 
QlinkActivity.java Qlink.it source file. 
Algorithm 4 Key and IV re-use in Qlink.it Android 
application. 
1: String String[] arrayEnc = 
encFiles.toArray(new 
 String[encFiles.size()]); 
2: for (int i = 0; i < arrayEnc.length; i++) { 
3:   JSONObject jof = new JSONObject(); 
4:   try { 
5:     jof.put("data", 
6:     util.encrypt(salt, iv, fpassword, 
arrayEnc[i])); 
3.3. Deciphering qlink messages in Android 
versions prior to 4.2 
Qlink.it Android application can be installed from 
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Google Play [3] on devices with Android Operating 
System as old as version 2.3. Google’s metrics on 
version implementation are available at [20]. 
According to the cryptography entry on Android 
4.2 security notes [21], the default implementation 
of SecureRandom was modified. Also from an 
official Google source [22], it was publicly known 
that there was a problem with using SecureRandom() 
in the way Qlink.it uses it. Starting with Android 
4.2, the default provider is OpenSSL and a 
developer can no longer override SecureRandom’s 
internal state, but the old implementation allowed 
overriding the internally generated key for each 
instance. Developers which attempted to explicitly 
seed the random number generator, as done in the 
Qlink.it application, would find that their seed 
replaces, not supplements, the existing seed. Using 
the same seed, prior to Android 4.2, invocations of 
nextInt() would always return the same number. 
Other problems beside [23,24], the way Qlink.it 
generates the password may be insecure in these 
devices because it consist in repeatedly seeding the 
generator with timestamps (with milliseconds 
precision) and previous results. Estimating a 
timestamp range, first user interaction could be 
brute-forced. For example, in Algorithm 5: 
Algorithm 5 Seeding the random number generator 
(invoking Algorithm 3 function). 
1: String public void onUserInteraction() { 
2:   Long curDate = new Date().getTime(); 
3:   password = generateRandomString(32, 
 curDate.toString() + password); 
4:   password = 
Base64.encodeToString(password.getBytes()
, Base64.DEFAULT).substring(0, 32); 
5: } 
The password variable is “updated” in every user 
interaction with the application, and exactly the 
same code is executed in afterTextChanged(). The 
variable is initialized with an empty string, so the 
first interaction seeds the generator with the 
timestamp only. The JSON encoded message that’s 
sent to the server includes a timestamp also with 
millisecond precision (as seen in Algorithm 1), 
giving a maximum limit to a potential attacker. 
Although in our experiments we have tested only 
very short messages, it was possible to find keys 
estimating time between interactions and processing 
time. 
Assuming the user would launch the app, tap on 
the message area (1), type two characters (2x3), and 
use the button (1) that generates the qlink (1); our 
debugging showed that a total of 9 invocations of the 
password update would be executed. However, for 
example, in most cases the first two of the three 
invocations per character are executed two 
milliseconds apart. 
This observation among others of the behavior of 
the application and estimations of fixed processing 
times were considered to write a simple program just 
for demonstration purposes (since larger messages 
and broader timing limits would imply incrementing 
exponentially the brute-force difficulty), that 
knowing the last timestamp, tries to decipher a two 
character (“no”) message making 10 x (1 x 3 x 
130)#characters x 10 x 10 ≈ 29,96 + 8,60(#characters) tries. A 
positive result example run of the far from optimized 
Java program, that on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i-7 
notebook would take approximately five hours (two 
and a half in average), is shown in the following 
Algorithm 6. 
Algorithm 6 Example output from brute-forcing a 
qlink generated on Android 4.1.1. 
1: cantidad de pruebas: 10000 / 152100000 - 
 1949 ms 
2: cantidad de pruebas: 20000 / 152100000 - 
1331 ms 
3: ... 
4: cantidad de pruebas: 45690000 / 152100000 - 
 1206 ms 
5: cantidad de pruebas: 45700000 / 152100000 - 
 1200 ms 
6: *** ENCONTRADO 
7: texto en claro: no 
8: password pre pbkdf2: 
bW9pZkR6SWZmTWtmaGF 
4. Conclusions
We have shown that the manipulation of parameters 
is possible, random number generation is not 
implemented in a secure manner, timestamps are 
used as seeds and key material can be truncated to 
an extent that may permit brute-force attacks. Other 
potential problems remains to be probed, for 
example, if the date and time could be estimated in 
the way described in [25], to possibly generate the 
same qlink repeatedly. 
Although most of the problems described may not 
be exploitable or impose a serious security risk, it is 
clear that the implementation is not following 
security best practices nor secure programming 
techniques from, for example, OWASP [26]. Till 
other reviewers or the developers confirm or reject 
the potential risks described, sending sensitive 
information via Qlink.it may not be recommended. 
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